The UN14CR shared this view. As the only international organization with a mandate to protect refugees, the UN14CR generally considers resettlement a threat to the principle of first asylum. The most reliable way to protect refugees is to make sure they have someplace to run without the risk of being refouled, or pushed back into harm's way.
Precipitous offers of third country resettlement may convince nations bordering conflict zones to close their frontiers or to accept refugees only conditionally. Indeed, when the flow of Kosovars turned from a trickle to a flood, the GOM threatened to seal its borders unless countries in the region agreed to open facilities in their own territory and to transfer residents out of camps in Macedonia. The UN14CR grudgingly cooperated with the relocation effort only after the GOM acted on its threat and temporarily closed its borders to new arrivals.
But despite mounting pressure, the GOM still rejected initial resettlement offers from The National Security Council has an ambiguous relationship with the CMRA. On the one hand, it is a nuisance. The solution its members offer to every refugee crisis is simplistic and the same: increase the number of admissions to the United States without regard to budgets or competing foreign policy considerations. 8 On the other hand, it is politically well connected, includes major party donors at the local and national levels, and owns the moral high ground on an extremely emotional issue. The United States is, after all, a country of immigrants and refugees. Saying "no" to the CMRA is tantamount to defacing the Statue of Liberty.
When the Vice President made his announcement at Ellis Island, the Administration was at a crossroads. Its publicly stated rationale for the air war was transparently false.
Bombs do not stop assassins and rapists. But public support for committing American airmen to combat rested on the refugee issue. The White House could not simply turn its back on the Kosovars while in their name it rained high explosives on Serbia. It desperately needed another gesture, even if only symbolic, to keep the humanitarian rationale for military action credible.
Conveniently, the CMRA was at a turning point of its own. The largest admissions programs contracted to its members were being either closed or downsized. The Orderly Departure Program for Vietnamese refugees had run its course after more than two decades and the State Department planned to terminate it at the end of the fiscal year. At the same time, in-country processing of Jews and evangelical Christians from the former Soviet Union was shrinking rapidly. In other words, a major portion of the CMRA membership's budget was in peril.
Under those circumstances, the NSC and the CMRA were the solutions to each other's problems. The NSC needed justification to overrule the advice of its own experts within the Administration and to recommend forceful, highly visible action on behalf of the refugees. The CMRA needed the NSC to mandate new contracts for refugee processing and an overall increase in the number of refugees admitted to the United States to compensate for lost business. (In fact, the CMRA tried to steer processing contracts to two of its members who had no experience in the region but were financially most vulnerable). 9 The decision to initiate resettlement processing was almost automatic.
Interestingly, the only congressional reaction came from Senator Robert Torricelli. Many of the Kosovar refugees would resettle in New Jersey or at least be housed temporarily at Fort Dix pending onward travel within the country. The Senator was concerned about the financial impact on local communities resulting from health care, financial aid and other 8 Terry Rusch, State Department 9 The author attended the initial meeting between PRM and the CMNRA at which Kosovar processing was discussed.
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assistance to which the refugees were entitled. After being reassured that HHS would pay the bill, he returned to the same level of disinterest exhibited by his colleagues. 10
Ironically, by the time the United States started admitting Kosovar refugees, the crisis in Macedonia was abating. Thousands of refugees accepted offers of temporary asylum from other countries in return for guarantees of help in going back to Kosovo as soon as possible. In addition, the GOM built new camps for additional arrivals, in part as quid pro quo for future development aid. Nevertheless, the symbolism was powerful.
National television networks carried live the arrival of the first planeload of Kosovars at
McGuire Air Force Base. News crews competed to win seats on subsequent flights to conduct heart-wrenching profiles of families split apart by Milosevic and reunited by America. In fact, the first child born to refugee parents at Fort Dix was named "American." The symbolism was so potent it obscured what should have been an equally strong signal that the airlift was not only unnecessary but also counterproductive. By the end of June, as the last flights of refugees were arriving via chartered flights at New York's JFK airport, the same planes were returning to Macedonia loaded with earlier arrivals now going home to Kosovo.
The Kosovar resettlement program was a winning domestic public relations campaign.
Humanitarian assistance supported broader, more complicated strategic interests that garnered only ambivalent interest from a skeptical electorate. It was not cost free, however, in terms of foreign policy leadership. By inserting itself into a relief effort where it was not wanted, the United States undermined its longer-term interest in sharing 10 The author attended the briefing with Sen. Torricelli the burden of humanitarian response. As new refugee crises emerge in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Colombia and elsewhere, American leadership will be suspect. Allies who already believe their interests are best served by closing their borders--like Germany and
Turkey--will be only too happy to defer all action to the ever-eager Americans. In the long run, refugees and a more humane world order will be better served by a cooperative international coalition than by a photo-op domestic agenda.
